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(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P•2d 1057, 
1061 (Utah Ct, App. 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent basically agrees with the "Statement of the Case" 
contained in Appellant's Brief pages 2-5. Essentially the 
reasoning of the Court is contained in the decision given from 
the bench on the day of trial. This portion of the trial 
transcript as it pertains to the issues in this case is contained 
in the Appendix to this Brief. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree which are contained in Appellant's Appendix 
also reflect the lower court's decision. The reasoning of the 
lower court and its decision will be discussed infra in the 
Argument portion of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant complains that the lower court abused its 
discretion in its award of alimony, property distribution, and 
attorneys' fees. This appeal does not involve any question as to 
child support, visitation, or custody and therefore no reference 
will be made to these unrelated issues. The "Statement of the 
Facts" contained in Appellant's Brief, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
5-8) while directly reciting some of the evidence available to 
the lower court failed to give this Court a total view of all of 
the evidence presented at trial. Basically, Appellant relies 
upon her own case in establishing a "fact" without reference to 
the evidence presented by Respondent. Thus, Appellant has failed 
to marshal all of the evidence relevant to the findings and then 
to show the findings to be clearly erroneous as is required under 
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differences Respondent frequently moved out of the house for 
extended periods of time and lived with various relatives. 
Respondent admitted that the parties during their marriage 
sometimes came to minor physical altercations but denied ever 
physically abusing or harming his wife, (Tr. p. 131). 
According to him Mrs. Bell took care of the family finances on a 
regular basis and wrote checks to the various creditors from a 
joint account. This included making house payments as well as 
credit card payments. (Tr. p. 102-103). According to her, her 
husband was responsible for making household payments during the 
course of the marriage. (Tr. p. 25). The parties have a joint 
account in which Respondent deposited all of his Air Force 
earnings as well as a sole account in the name of Appellant in 
which Appellant would randomly deposit her teaching income. (Tr. 
pp. 41-42). 
During the period of time that the parties lived together 
Appellant obtained a master's degree while working full time with 
the Air Force. Appellant testified that there was a mutual 
agreement that each one would help the other obtain an advanced 
degree. She stated that without her help he would not have been 
able to receive his degree while working. (Tr. p. 13). 
Respondent, on the other hand, acknowledged that she assisted him 
during the time period he was obtaining his degree but stated 
unequivocably that he could have obtained it without her help had 
he been required to do so. (Tr. pp. 165-66). 
The parties sharply disagreed as to the spending habits of 
the other. Mrs. Bell stated that her husband insisted that they 
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spend money in order to maintain his image as an officer even 
though it was more than they could afford. She stated she wanted 
to buy a much cheaper house but he would not hear of it. She 
stated that he would frequently buy their daughter $50 or $60 
dresses even though she argued it was too much for a growing 
girl. (Tr. pp. 35-6). He, on the other hand, contended that his 
wife was always over spending money and running them into debt. 
He testified that he would frequenly complain about her spending 
$75 for his daughter's dress when she was clearly going to be 
grown out of it in a short period of time. (Tr. pp. 114, 151). 
During their period in North Carolina the parties had incurred 
several long-term obligations including loans, car payments, and 
credit cards which consumed the majority of their income. 
In April of 1987 Respondent was ordered to Korea for a 
one-year tour of duty. Appellant did not wish to accompany him 
there and in fact stated that she was considering quitting her 
teaching position and moving to a city in which she could obtain 
an advanced degree. (Tr. p. 39). Appellant stayed at the 
North Carolina home during Respondent's tour of duty in Korea and 
continued her high school teaching job. 
Immediately prior to leaving for Korea Respondent received a 
$1,200 check for damage sustained to his car in an accident as 
well as a check for $10,200 as settlement for his personal 
injuries in that accident. (Tr. p. 104). At that time 
Respondent also received an advanced of $5,000 on his military 
pay and placed $1,500 of that in the joint checking account. He 
used the remaining money for uniform expenses and for 
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supplemental income in Korea during his one-year stay. Some of 
this money went to buying gifts, clothes, and a brass bed for his 
wife and daughter. (Tr. p. 110) . Respondent testified that to 
his knowledge when he left for Korea all of the bills were 
current and there was no financial problem existing. (Tr. p. 
108) . 
Appellant, contrary to Respondent, stated that when 
Respondent left for Korea there were many unpaid bills which had 
to be paid. She acknowledged that her husband wanted the $10,000 
check put into a savings certificate but stated she could not do 
this because of the bills that had to be paid and therefore 
placed it into the joint checking account. (Tr. p. 67). 
The record is undisputed that as of April 20, 1987 there was 
$11,528 placed in the joint account and that the following month 
$9,574 was withdrawn by the appellant leaving a balance of only 
$3,171. (Tr. pp. 61-62). Further, the record is undisputed 
that during this period that Respondent was in Korea he 
automatically paid to her each month approximately $1,600. This, 
together with her own salary gave her approximately $2,500 a 
month of disposable income. (Tr. pp. 71-2). Appellant 
acknowledged that she did not tell her husband that his 
settlement money had been spent since she was afraid it would 
upset him. (Tr. p. 69). 
Respondent testified that as far as he knew the debts were 
current when he left for Korea. He did not authorize his wife to 
use the settlement money to pay bills. (Tr. p. 103). 
Furthermore, he had no explanation as to how $9,500 could have 
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been spent within thirty days after his leaving for Korea. (Tr. 
p. 120). While Respondent was in Korea Appellant allowed her 
nephew to move in the residence although he paid no rent or board 
and room during his stay. (Tr. p. 57). 
While Respondent was still in Korea Appellant did three 
acts without the permission or knowledge of the respondent. 
First, she cashed in the couple's mutual funds for approximately 
$4,500. She admitted she did not tell her husband about this 
withdrawal. (Tr. p. 66). Second, she took out a $4,000 loan 
from her credit union in order to protect herself from her 
husband's anger when he returned home and would find no money in 
the joint account. (Tr. p. 73). Finally, she loaned $1,800 to 
her sister to prevent a foreclosure on their home. (Tr. p. 73). 
Respondent testified that he was not aware of the mutual fund 
withdrawal and did not authorize it. (Tr. p. 106). He also 
stated that he has never seen evidence that the loan to the 
sister has ever been repaid and that he would not have agreed to 
it had he known. (Tr. p. 120). 
After returning home the parties had serious disputes 
concerning the financial status of their account. At this time 
Appellant announced that she was going to move to Logan, Utah to 
continue her education at Utah State. Appellant told her that he 
could not afford two households and that she should move with him 
to New Mexico with the Air Force accomodations. She told him not 
to worry about the bills that she could take care of herself and 
Stephanie. (Tr. p. 116). After arriving in Logan Appellant 
obtained a teaching assistant job for $863 a month. During the 
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interim between the move to Logan and the divorce Respondent had 
been paying $450 a month as child support. At the time of trial 
Appellant projected that she would graduate with her master's 
degree by May of 1990- At that time she would either go back to 
North Carolina and teach school or stay in Logan to obtain a 
Ph.D. She testified that this would require an additional three 
years of study. (Tr. pp. 4, 11). 
Appellant testified as to her anticipated costs of living 
including such items as $100 a month for her child's various 
lessons, $200 a month to accumulate air fare for two trips to 
North Carolina each year, $250 per month for car needs, $160 a 
month for utilities and $4,000 for anticipated dental work for 
Appellant. (Tr. pp. 16-20, 46-48; Exhibits 9, 10). In February 
of 1990 she liquidated her school retirement fund of 
approximately $7,600. (Tr. p. 32). Appellant presented a list 
of debts (Exhibit 11) which contained a number of accounts and 
loans which were solely in her name. (Tr. pp. 85-90). 
Respondent testified that during their marriage they 
acquired a considerable amount of furniture. In Exhibit 14 he 
evaluated the furniture that was acquired, depreciated it, and 
concluded that Appellant had approximately $6,200 worth of 
furniture still in her possession. (Tr. pp. 117-19). He further 
testified that he is presently in charge of the North Carolina 
residence and is attempting to sell it while it is being rented. 
While his income from the rental is approximately $450 a month 
his expenses exceed this amount by approximately $175. (Tr. p. 
123). Exhibit 4 offered by Respondent lists the existing debts 
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and the monthly payments incurred by Respondent as to his various 
needs and encumbrances. He stated that since arriving in New 
Mexico it was necessary for him to take out nearly $13,000 in 
loans in order to meet living expenses, provide minimal 
furniture, pay for travel costs to see his daughter, and pay for 
attorney and litigation fees. (Tr. pp. 158-61). He further 
stated that he did not believe there was any equity in the home 
if it could be sold and that his present furniture had no equity 
in view of the debt service which was required. (Tr. pp. 137, 
171) . 
Respondent maintained that no alimony was due to Appellant 
since the parties were essentially living together for only four 
or five years, that she was capable of working in a gainful 
employment status, and that she had previously taken a large 
share of the marital assets while he was in Korea. (Tr. pp. 
130-31). He maintained that she should be given the furniture 
that she had in her possession together with a ring which he paid 
$2,500 when new (Tr. p. 173) and that each party assume their own 
debts which had been incurred. In addition, Respondent agreed to 
take control of the house and to sell it for whatever price he 
could obtain. Finally, he agreed to pay $450 a month child 
support which was above the state guideline. 
Appellant, on the other hand, wanted her husband responsible 
for almost all of her own privately incurred bills, her 
attorneys' fees, and wanted $1,500 for alimony and child support. 
(Tr. pp. 52, 132-34) . 
As is evidenced by the judgefs bench ruling the Court took 
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the position that both parties had been wreckless in their 
standard of living by incuring debts in order to maintain an 
artificial level of affluence. He concluded that basically the 
parties had lived their separate lives during the course of the 
marriage and that each one should be responsible for their own 
debts and liabilities since both were capable of self-support. 
He awarded Appellant $250 a month alimony for a two-year period 
but, because of the financial circumstances of the respondent, 
credited her this amount in the furniture which she had in her 
possession. In addition, the Court required Respondent to pay 
$800 of Appellant's attorneys fees as well as $450 a month child 
support. The Court also awarded Appellant an interest in 
Respondent's military retirement fund based upon the "Woodward 
Formula" subject to a reduction of $3,800 which was half of the 
amount removed by Appellant from her retirement fund. 
It is from this order that the present appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $250 
per month for alimony during a two-year period to the appellant 
wife in view of the nature of this marriage in which each party 
essentially maintained their own life, where the parties have 
lived separately for over half of the marriage, and where 
Appellant has already expended a large portion of the marital 
assets for her own purposes. 
2. The lower court did not abuse its discretion in the 
property distribution in light of the circumstances of the 
marriage, the almost non-existent equity of any property acquired 
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during the marriage, and the high debt service incurred by both 
parties• 
3. The lower court did not abuse its discretion in its 
aware of attorneys1 fees to Appellant in light of the financial 
circumstances of each party as well as the expenses incurred in 
litigation by each party. 
4. Appellant should not be awarded attorneys' fees on this 
appeal since her arguments are without merit and she cannot be a 
prevailing party. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
TO THE APPELLANT. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. An 
appellate court will not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the 
standards set by the appellate court. Osguthrope v. 
Osguthorpe, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
"The purposes of an alimony award include enabling the 
receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage," and preventing him or her 
from becoming a public charge. Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 88, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990; Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (Utah 1988). The standard for alimony as noted by 
Appellant has been established by the Utah Supreme Court and by 
this Court in numerous cases. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10). If 
the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of 
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alimony this Court will not disturb its award absent a showing 
that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Munns v. Munns, 131 Adv. Rep. at 90. 
These facts may be derived from the actual factual findings of 
the court or from the record itself when it is clear and 
uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment. Acton v. Delirian, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987) . 
Before addressing the arguments raised by Appellant it is 
well to note the observations made by the trial court concerning 
the uniqueness of this marriage. The Court stated: 
As to alimony, I need to make an observation. As 
you have indicated both of you, this is not an ordinary 
situation. Each of you have had and pursued separate 
careers or there has been a history of marital 
problems. It appears to me that the only thing you 
really have in common is the child. And you have both 
quarreled over financial affairs. And I have to 
observe that whatever standard of living that you have 
had is one that has been based on borrowed money and 
depleted assets on both parts. And as I sit here and 
look at both of your financial statements and your debt 
structure and your obligations that you have, the bulk 
of it is repaying loans and you dissipated savings, 
you've dissipated settlements, you've dissipated 
apparently every asset that you ever had, and your only 
source now is your individual earning capacity. 
I find that unfortunate, but it's a reality. I 
observe that because to make an alimony aware requires 
that you find a number of things, at least three. And 
the courts have said that you have to find the 
financial conditions—needs of the receiving spouse in 
this case. The ability of the receiving spouse to 
provide an income for herself, and then the ability of 
the providing spouse to do so. Certainly, and there 
has been reference to a standard of living. 
The standard of living I find to have been 
established artificially. To note be realistic in any 
way, shape or form for either of the parties. It 
appears to me that if you wanted something, you bought 
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it and waited to see what tomorrow brought. And 
tomorrow comes right now. And this is the time of 
accountability. And so the standard of living I find 
has really not been very helpful and to not have 
existed over an extended period of time because of the 
fact that you have essentially maintained separate 
households, coming together for convenience from time 
to time. And that's a troubling thing for the court, 
but it's a reality that I am faced with. 
So what I will do is, as far as alimony, is in 
lieu of alimony, and I sat down and computed what the 
defendant could pay, which is essentially nothing, 
what the plaintiff needed, which is a great deal, and 
asked how it could be paid. (Tr. pp. 180-82). 
Thus, the lower court specifically found that the parties in 
this case lived greatly beyond their means both jointly and 
individually and that therefore the "standard of living" which 
they acquired was an artificial one which could not be 
practicably maintained by either party. The observations of the 
trial court together with the basic undisputed evidence in the 
record explain the award given. 
Appellant argues that the court had to accept Plaintiff's 
monthly projected expense of $2,493.00 as contained in Exhibit 9. 
Based upon that projection and based upon her then current income 
as a teaching assistant Appellant argues that she is 
substantially in debt each month. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
10-11) . The court, however, essentially stated that this 
projected standard of living was not realistic in light of the 
capacities of the parties. This is especially true since 
Plaintiff contemplated such luxuries as extensive lessons for her 
daughter, $2,400 in travel each year, and nearly $3,600 in 
automobile expenses. It can hardly be stated that Exhibit 9 
contains either a bare-boned or a realistic budget of Appellant's 
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needs. 
As to the second factor of Appellant's ability to support 
herself the lower court specifically found her earning capacity 
to be $1,500 a month. This figure was based upon her previous 
nine-month salary as a school teacher with a bachelor's degree. 
This amount would be much lower than the new salary she would 
receive should she return to teaching with a newly acquired 
master's degree which she should have obtained at the time this 
appeal is argued. Appellant acknowledged that it is her own 
choice to pursue full-time education rather than to obtain an 
advanced degree on a part-time basis while teaching school. It 
is her choice if she wishes to remain a full-time student with no 
substantial source of income for another three year period rather 
than returning to North Caroline, obtaining a well-paying jobr 
and pursuing a part-time education. 
The reference to the Martinez case contained in 
Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, p. 11) is inappropriate. 
First, this case has questionable validity at the moment since 
certiorari has been granted by the Utah Supreme Court to review 
the decision. (98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3). More importantly, however, 
in Martinez the parties lived a very meager life while the 
wife worked and the husband went to school. Here, to the 
contrary, the parties lived a standard of living well beyond 
their means with both parties working and with the husband only 
attending school on a part-time basis. 
The argument made by Appellant that she is entitled to 
Respondent's support for a degree just as she supported him is 
-14-
also flawed. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13). First, Respondent 
did not have the luxury of quitting his full-time job and 
devoting his whole effort to that of a student. Rather, he was 
required to work full time and to go to school part time. 
Appellant wishes a different result by requiring Respondent to 
support her while she has the luxury of attending school without 
any full-time job responsibilities. 
Second, since Appellant has already obtained her master's 
degree and has helped pay for it from funds acquired during the 
marriage she cannot now expect Respondent to pay for an 
additional three years or more of college. Respondent did not 
obtain a Ph.D. degree as is now being requested by Appellant. 
Third, it was Appellant's own choice to move to Utah to 
obtain the master's degree. The evidence is uncontroverted that 
she could have remained in North Carolina or have gone to a 
school in that proximity which would have substantially reduced 
her living expenses. In fact, she could have joined Respondent 
in New Mexico and pursued a degree there. Since the court noted 
that each individual has basically pursued their own life 
independent of the other it is certainly not Respondent's 
obligation to now support her for this optional education 
effort. 
A review of the record clearly shows that Respondent is 
in deep financial trouble even though he currently makes $40,000 
a year with the Air Force. The North Carolina house together 
with his own living expense requirements as well as the loans and 
other debts he incurred during his marriage and outside of his 
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marriage has basically consumed all of his income. While 
Appellant argues that his monthly expenses are "suspect" 
(Appellantfs Brief, pp. 13-14) they are no more suspect than 
those claimed by Appellant. In fact, however, a review of 
Exhibit 4 showing Respondent's expenses as compared with Exhibit 
11 showing Appellant's expenses reveals that his are much more 
realistic and less likely to be inflated. The present debts of 
Respondent, the requirement to pay $450 in child support, plus 
the costs of the litigation do not permit him to support his 
otherwise self-sustaining wife. The award of $250 a month for a 
two-year period was essentially all that Respondent could have 
borne under the best of circumstances. 
In awarding Appellant the furniture items valued at $6,000 
the court accomplished the goal of giving her something of value 
for her alimony award without further draining the resources of 
Respondent. It should also be remembered that while the court 
officially awarded her the furniture and ring in her possession 
it also allowed her to keep all of the money which she expended 
during Respondent's absence in Korea which was a sum over 
$15,000. This result was certainly more equitable than requiring 
her to pay to him either $6,000 or $3,000 for the value of the 
furniture and then requiring him to pay to her $250 a month for a 
two-year period. The lower court was entitled to great latitude 
in determining the most equitable method of alimony 
distribution. 
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POINT II 
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION MADE BY THE LOWER 
COURT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) (1989) requires that the 
property distribution in a divorce be "equitable". See also, 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). The general 
purpose of the property distribution is to enable the former 
spouses to pursue their separate lives as well as possible. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). Appropriate 
considerations in dividing property include the amount and kind 
of property to be divided, the source of the property, the 
parties1 health, the parties' standard of living and respective 
financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the 
duration of the marriage, and the relationship the property has 
with the amount of alimony awarded. Naranio v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1147-48 (Utah App. 1988). 
A review of the undisputed record in this case shows that 
while the parties incurred tremendous debt they have little 
tangible property to show for it. The North Carolina residence 
is a drain of some $200 a month upon Respondent with little hope 
that any equity will ever be realized if the house should be 
sold. The only other property which is free and clear of debt 
consists of the furniture in Appellantfs possession together with 
the items of personal clothing, etc. that each party and the 
child now maintain. In essence, Appellant received the only 
unencumbered marital property from the marriage. 
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While Respondent stated that he did not believe the property 
he acquired in New Mexico and Korea was marital property such 
statement has no legal effect regardless of its accuracy since 
there was no equity contained in this property because of the 
debt which Respondent had incurred and was still paying on at the 
time of divorce. Since the lower court specifically found that 
the parties have been living essentially separate lives with 
marriage as a mere convenience it is not unreasonable to divide 
the encumbered personal property in such a way that each person 
should receive both the property and the accompanying debt. 
One other item should be mentioned in this regard. The 
lower court specifically required Respondent to divide his 
military pension at the appropriate time in accordance with the 
Woodward formula. Since Respondent was technically married to 
the Appellant for approximately eleven years it is very probable 
that at the time the pension vests Appellant will receive a 
fairly substantial sum. While this amount cannot be realized at 
the moment by Appellant it is essentially money in the bank which 
Appellant can count on for her future needs. The retirement 
benefit therefore will prove to be a substantial property 
distribution in the future even though the parties essentially 
have nothing at the present to divide. 
Finally, it should be noted that while Appellant complains 
about the distribution of the lower court she makes no suggestion 
for an alternative resolution. It is submitted that based upon 
the high debt involved in this marriage as compared with the low 
asset value that the lower court did everything it could in 
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equitably providing for the parties. There was simply nothing 
left to distribute- The court did not abuse its discretion. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES BY THE LOWER 
COURT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A trial court has the authority to award attorneys' fees in 
divorce proceedings. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) . The decision to award fees rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, but must be based on 
evidence of financial need and reasonableness. Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). 
Respondent acknowledges that the hourly rate charged by 
Appellant's attorney was reasonable under the circumstances. He, 
in fact, incurred nearly an identical amount of fees of $2,500 
for his attorneys. He did maintain, however, that much of the 
expenses involved in the case occurred because of the 
unreasonable demand of his wife in requesting a $1,500 child 
support and alimony monthly payment which was clearly beyond any 
reasonable means of Respondent. (Tr. pp. 132-35). 
While it is true that Respondent makes a greater salary each 
year than does Appellant it is also true that the debt service 
now carried by Respondent is much greater especially in light of 
having to subsidize the North Carolina house. Since it was 
necessary for Respondent to borrow money just to pay his own 
attorneys (Tr. p. 161) it was not unreasonable for the court to 
decline to require additional loans to be taken by Respondent in 
order to pay for Appellant's attorney. Proportionately, each 
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party is in the exact financial situation based upon their income 
and obligations. The court found neither party to be at fault in 
this marriage and therefore it is fair that both parties share 
the burden of litigation. 
For this reason, the award was in fact reasonable and should 
be allowed to stand. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE DENIED ATTORNEYS1 
FEES ON THIS APPEAL. 
This Court may order either party to pay attorneys1 fees 
under Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989) including attorneys' 
fees incurred on appeal. Ostler v. Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 
1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Before an appellate attorneys1 fee can be awarded the 
reguesting party must prevail on at least a majority of the 
issues raised on appeal. Further, it must be shown that the 
appellate fees are reasonable and that the requesting party is in 
need of financial assistance. Bagshaw, 129 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 55. 
Here, it is submitted that Appellant will not prevail in 
this appeal since the alimony award was fair under the 
circumstances of this case as was the property distribution. 
Moreover, the lower court attorneys1 fees were well within the 
discretion of the lower court. 
Evert assuming arguendo that she prevails on any issue in 
this appeal the record is clear that her financial situation 
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especially now that she has presumably graduated with her 
master's degree does not establish a greater financial need than 
that of Respondent with his numerous debts and encumbrances. The 
reasonableness of any attorney fee would, of course, have to be 
determined in an evidentiary hearing even if the previous two 
conditions were deemed satisfied. 
For these reasons, therefore, attorneys' fees on appeal 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant in this case has selectively plucked the 
record to fit her own needs and arguments. She has failed to 
marshal the evidence as is required in order to allow this Court 
to review the entire scope of evidence available to the trial 
court at the time the award was made. This fact alone should 
require affirmance of the decision. 
In addition, even a cursory review of the record as outlined 
by Respondent shows that this has been a troubled marriage from 
its inception and that the parties are not entitled to the normal 
presumptions and benefits of a harmonious marriage relationship. 
The mere fact that the parties were physically separated through 
their own choice for over half of the term of the marriage 
indicates a serious problem. In addition, the finances of the 
parties in maintaining separate accounts and in buying separate 
assets indicates the unusual nature of this relationship. 
When these factors are considered together with the 
observation of the trial court that the parties created an 
artificial standard of living by digging themselves into a 
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debtors1 grave the lower court did everything it could to resolve 
the financial dilemma facing it. It is unfortunate that both 
parties through their actions incurred enormous debts with little 
to show for it. 
While Appellant is upset because she did not receive more 
support from her former husband it must be remembered that many 
of the choices in this matter were her own and that she is 
certainly not deserving of better treatment than her husband. 
Neither party in this divorce will benefit from the award of the 
court. In fact, the divorce decree becomes one of basically 
cutting the losses rather than dividing the gains. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court did an 
admirable job in fashioning this divorce decree and it should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this day of September, 1990. 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Lyle W. Hillyard, Attorney 
for Appellant, 175 East First Worth, Logan, Utah 84321 this 
day of September, 1990. 
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MR. HEALY: SOMETIME BETWEEN CHRISTMAS AND NEW 
YEAR'S? 
THE COURTS THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. HILLYARDs JUST LET US KNOW. 
THE COURT: FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. 
MR. HILLYARD: OKAY. 
THE COURT: AND THEN ANY SPECIAL — ANY VISITATION 
OTHER THAN THE SCHEDULED — PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED VISITATION 
SHOULD BE NO LESS THAN 48 HOURS ADVANCE NOTICE. IF YOU'RE IN 
TOWN OR YOU'RE TRAVELING FROM ONE BASE TO ANOTHER, OR YOU HAVE 
SOME LEAVE TIME OR WHATEVER, A MINIMUM OF 48 HOURS NOTICE TO 
MOM SO THAT SHE WILL UNDERSTAND, SO SHE WILL KNOW AND BE ABLE 
TO MAKE THAT. AND I'LL — I WOULD ALSO PUT A RESTRAINING 
ORDER THAT YOU BOTH BE RESTRAINED FROM DISCUSSING IN A 
NEGATIVE WAY THE OTHER PARENT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CHILD. 
NOW, AS TO YOUR REAL PROPERTY, I FIND THAT THERE REALLY 
IS NO EQUITY IN THAT HOME. AND I RECOGNIZE IT'S PROBABLY BEEN 
A LIABILITY UP TO THIS POINT. I THINK CONVENIENCE WOULD 
INDICATE THAT OUGHT TO BE AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT, AND I'LL 
AWARD THE PROPERTY, REAL PROPERTY, TO THE DEFENDANT SUBJECT TO 
THE INDEBTEDNESS AND TO HOLD THE PLAINTIFF HARMLESS THEREFROM. 
AND THE PLAINTIFF IS TO SIGN WHATEVER DOCUMENTS MAY BE 
NECESSARY TO TRANSFER TITLE. 
AS TO ALIMONY, I NEED TO MAKE AN OBSERVATION. AS YOU'VE 
INDICATED, BOTH OF YOU, THIS IS NOT AN ORDINARY SITUATION. 
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EACH OF YOU HAVE HAD AND PURSUED SEPARATE CAREERS OR THERE HAS 
BEEN A HISTORY OF MARITAL PROBLEMS. APPEARS TO ME THAT THE 
ONLY THING YOU REALLY HAVE IN COMMON IS THE CHILD. AND YOU 
HAVE BOTH QUARRELLED OVER FINANCIAL AFFAIRS. AND I HAVE TO 
OBSERVE THAT WHATEVER STANDARD OF LIVING THAT YOU HAVE HAD IS 
ONE THAT HAS BEEN BASED ON BORROWED MONEY AND DEPLETED ASSETS 
ON BOTH PARTS. AND AS I SIT HERE AND LOOK AT BOTH OF YOUR 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND YOUR DEBT STRUCTURE AND YOUR 
OBLIGATIONS THAT YOU HAVE, THE BULK OF IT IS REPAYING LOANS 
AND YOU'VE DISSIPATED SAVINGS, YOU'VE DISSIPATED SETTLEMENTS, 
YOU'VE DISSIPATED APPARENTLY EVER ASSET THAT YOU HAD, AND YOUR 
ONLY SOURCE NOW IS YOUR INDIVIDUAL EARNING CAPACITY. AND I 
FIND THAT UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT'S A REALITY. I OBSERVE THAT 
BECAUSE TO MAKE AN ALIMONY AWARD REQUIRES THAT YOU FIND A 
NUMBER OF THINGS, AT LEAST THREE. AND THE COURTS HAVE SAID 
THAT YOU HAVE TO FIND THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS — NEEDS OF THE 
RECEIVING SPOUSE IN THIS CASE. THE ABILITY OF THE RECEIVING 
SPOUSE TO PROVIDE AN INCOME FOR HERSELF. AND THEN THE ABILITY 
OF THE PROVIDING SPOUSE TO DO SO. CERTAINLY, AND THERE'S BEEN 
REFERENCE TO A STANDARD OF LIVING. THE STANDARD OF LIVING I 
FIND TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ARTIFICIALLY. TO NOT BE 
REALISTIC IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM FOR EITHER OF THE PARTIES. 
IT APPEARS TO ME THAT IF YOU WANTED SOMETHING, YOU BOUGHT IT 
AND WAITED TO SEE WHAT TOMORROW BROUGHT. AND TOMORROW COMES 
RIGHT NOW. AND THIS IS THE TIME OF ACCOUNTABILITY. AND SO 
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THE STANDARD OF LIVING I FIND HAS REALLY NOT BEEN VERY 
HELPFUL. AND TO NOT HAVE EXISTED OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF 
TIME BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE ESSENTIALLY MAINTAINED 
SEPARATE HOUSEHOLDS, COMING TOGETHER FOR CONVENIENCE FROM TIME 
TO TIME. AND THAT'S A TROUBLING THING FOP THE COURT, BUT IT'S 
A REALITY THAT I'M JUST FACED WITH. SO WHAT I WILL DO IS, AS 
FAR AS ALIMONY, IS IN LIEU OF ALIMONY, AND I SET DOWN AND 
* 
COMPUTED WHAT THE DEFENDANT COULD PAY, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY 
NOTHING, WHAT THE PLAINTIFF NEEDED, WHICH IS A GREAT DEAL, AND 
ASKED HOW IT COULD BE PAID. AND I FEEL LIKE IN LIEU OF 
ALIMONY, I COMPUTED IF YOU PAID ALIMONY FOR TWO YEARS TO GIVE 
THE PLAINTIFF SOME TIME TO ADJUST TO THE FACT THAT SHE'S GOING 
TO BE LIVING ON HER OWN INCOME, EVEN THOUGH THERE'S BEEN A 
PERIOD OF TIME THAT THAT HAS BEEN BEING DONE ALREADY, DISPUTED 
TESTIMONY, BUT ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY BY AGREEMENT AND BY 
THE PLAINTIFF, SHE'S SAID BECAUSE OF NEGLECT ON HIS PART, AND 
I RECOGNIZE THE DIFFERENCE IN TESTIMONY ON THAT ISSUE, BUT 
*250 A MONTH FOR TWO YEARS IS $6,00©. IN LIEU OF — THAT'S 
WHAT I WILL ORDER, BUT IN LIEU OF THAT, I WILL REQUIRE THAT IT 
BE PAID BY THE PLAINTIFF RECEIVING — THERE'S TWO WAYS THAT IT 
COULD BE — COME OUT. THE PLAINTIFF RECEIVE — PROBABLY THE 
BEST WAY IS BY AWARDING HER ALL THE PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT'S 
IN HER POSSESSION. THAT'S INCLUDED ON THE DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
14, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ITEMS THAT ARE ON THE — THERE 
AS INDICATED IN THE PERSONAL CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT. NOW, I 
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REALIZE THERE'S SOME QUESTION ON VALUES, BUT THE VALUES WERE 
NOT CHALLENGED NOR IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE THAT I HAVE. OTHER 
THAN THOSE VALUES- AND TYPICALLY, I DON'T GO TOO MUCH ON 
VALUES BECAUSE YOU CAN PUT WHATEVER VALUES YOU WANT TO ON 
THOSE. BUT JUST MY LOOKING AT THEM, I DON'T FIND THIS TO BE 
UNREASONABLE, AT LEAST NOT PATENTLY UNREASONABLE AS I LOOK AT 
THEM. 
SO IN LIEU OF ALIMONY, 1 GRANT ALL OF THE PROPERTY THAT 
THE — THAT IS LISTED ON THE PLAINTIFF'S — ON DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 14 TO THE — TO THE PLAINTIFF WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
THE THREE ITEMS THAT ARE ALREADY MARKED AS IN THE PRESENCE OF 
THE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE — OF THE DEFENDANT. 
AS TO THE DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS, I'M BACK TO THE FACT 
THAT YOU HAVE REALLY MAINTAINED TWO IDENTITIES, TWO LIVES, AND 
— AND HAVE CONDUCTED YOURSELVES ESSENTIALLY AS INDIVIDUALS, 
WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS. AND IT'S A CONFUSING THING TO THE 
COURT, BUT I FIND IT INTERESTING THAT BOTH OF YOU HAVE 
SEPARATE CHARGE ACCOUNTS, BOTH OF YOU HAVE INCURRED SEPARATE 
DEBTS, YOU HAVE NOT COSIGNED ON ANYTHING, YOU'VE MAINTAINED 
SEPARATE IDENTITIES. THE ONLY MINGLING THAT HAS BEEN DONE WAS 
WITH THE PAYCHECKS ESSENTIALLY FROM TIME TO TIME. PiND SO IF 
YOU TAKE AWAY THE NORTHWESTERN BANK AND THE NORTHWEST FINANCE, 
WHICH IS *1£, 01ZH3 ROUGHLY, WHICH WERE, IF THE COURT'S MEMORY IS 
CORRECT, FAIRLY RECENT DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY THE 
DEFENDANT, YOU HAVE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT DEBTS AND 
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OBLIGATIONS THAT WERE INCURRED BY THE PARTIES. 
SO THE ORDER WILL BE FOR THAT REASON, AND BECAUSE OF HOW 
THE DEBTS WERE INCURRED AND WHOSE NAME THEY WERE INCURRED IN 
AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEM, I WILL ORDER THAT EACH 
PAY WHATEVER DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS WERE INCURRED IN THEIR 
NAME. AND I THINK IF YOU LOOK AT THE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 11, 
THAT ESSENTIALLY LISTS THEM. AND IT MAY NOT BE ACCURATE IN 
ALL RESPECTS AS TO AMOUNTS, BUT I THINK THAT COVERS ALL OF THE 
DEBTS AS I RECALL THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES WITH SOME 
DIFFERENCE IN AMOUNT. 
OKAY. THE RETIREMENT TO BE — TO BE DIVIDED ACCORDING TO 
THE WOODWARD FORMULA WITH THE — A CREDIT BEING GIVEN UPON 
DISTRIBUTION FOR THE — FOR ONE-HALF OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
RETIREMENT ALREADY TAKEN OUT, WHICH IS *3,800. 
THE INSURANCE, I WOULD — WILL ORDER THE DEFENDANT TO 
MAINTAIN INSURANCE ON THE CHILD AND FOR THE CHILD'S BENEFIT AS 
IT PRESENTLY EXISTS AND NOT TO FALL BELOW THE LEVEL THAT NOW 
EXISTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CHILD. AND THAT'S THE HEALTH 
AND ACCIDENT, MEDICAL AND LIFE INSURANCE. 
MR. HEALYr YOUR HONOR, COULD THERE BE A PROVISION 
THAT IF HE WERE TO REMARRY, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO INCLUDE ANY 
ADDITIONAL CHILDREN? 
THE COURT: HE MAY, BUT NOT TO DIMINISH THE 
PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT — NOT THE PROPORTIONATE — THE DOLLAR 
AMOUNT AS IT NOW EXISTS FOR THE CHILD. SO IF HE'S GOT *50,000 
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LIFE INSURANCE ON THE CHILD, THAT'S TO CONTINUE. IF HE HAS 
ANOTHER CHILD, HE IS TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST 50 ON THIS CHILD, 
NOT TO DIVIDE THAT BY THREE OR FOUR OR WHATEVER NUMBER OF 
OTHER CHILDREN THAT HE MAY HAVE. APPRECIATE THAT AND THAT'S A 
VALID QUESTION, COUNSEL. 
OKAY. AS FAR AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, THAT'S A DIFFICULT 
QUESTION BECAUSE I REALIZE THAT THERE'S A VERY LIMITED 
ABILITY, BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT I AM REALLY NOT ORDERING 
THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE A LOT OF OUT-OF-POCKET PAYMENTS IN THIS 
PARTICULAR CASE, I'LL ORDER THAT HE PAY *80© TOWARD THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND EACH PARTY TO BEAR THE 
DIFFERENCE IN AMOUNT PERSONALLY. 
MR. HILLYARD: WHAT ABOUT COSTS? 
THE COURT: AND COSTS. NOW, HAVE I COVERED 
EVERYTHING? I'VE GONE DOWN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS EVERYTHING. 
MR. HILLYARD: THE THING ABOUT THE SAVINGS BONDS, I 
THINK THERE'S — 
THE COURT: I THINK THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT HE HAS 
THOSE IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD, AND I'LL INCLUDE THE SAVINGS 
BONDS BEING MAINTAINED IN THE LEVEL THAT THEY NOW EXIST FOR 
THAT CHILD. THAT WOULDN'T REQUIRE YOU TO INCREASE THOSE, BUT 
I UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE THEM AND IT'S YOUR TESTIMONY, SIR, THAT 
YOU PLAN ON MAINTAINING THEM FOR THE BENEFIT OF — 
MR. BELL: I'LL STILL BUY — 
MR. HEALY: YOUR HONOR, IT WAS 14 INSTEAD OF 15. 
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THE COURT: WHATEVER NOW EXISTS, THEY BE MAINTAINED 
AT AT LEAST THAT LEVEL. YOU CAN ADD TO THEM BUT YOU CAN'T 
TAKE FROM THEM. 
MR. HEALY: YOUR HONOR, I PRESUME THAT THOSE ORDERS 
WITH RESPECT TO LIFE INSURANCE, BONDS, ET CETERA, WOULD 
CONTINUE UNTIL THE MATURITY OF THE CHILD, LEGAL AGE? 
THE COURT: THEY WILL UNTIL LEGAL AGE. AND I ASSUME 
THAT'S FAIRLY STANDARD ACROSS THE COUNTRY REGARDLESS OF WHERE 
YOU LIVE. I'LL SAY AGE IS IN CASE THERE'S SOME DISPUTE, IN 
CASE ONE OF THEM LIVES IN A JURISDICTION WHERE THAT'S A 
DIFFERENT AGE. SAY IB. ANYTHING ELSE THAT I MISSED, COUNSEL, 
MR. HILLYARD, THAT YOU CAN THINK OF? MR. HEALY? 
MR. HILLYARD: JUST LOOKING. ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE A 
FINDING WHAT HER SALARY IS? ACTUALLY, THE STATEMENT WE PUT IN 
THERE'S — 
THE COURT: WELL, I ATTRIBUTE TO HER — IF WE NEED TO 
MAKE A FINDING, I'LL ATTRIBUTE TO HER AT LEAST THE SALARY THAT 
SHE WAS MAKING AT THE TIME SHE QUIT. 
MR. HILLYARD: 1,50© — 
THE COURT: WHICH — WELL — 
MR. HEALY: 18,000. 
THE COURT: I THINK IT WAS IS — 
MR. HILLYARD: 1,500 A YEAR — 
THE COURT: — AS A TEACHER, 15 A MONTH, 18,000 A 
YEAR — 
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1 II MR. HEALY: RIGHT. 
2 THE COURT: — IS WHAT MY NOTES SHOW. I'LL ATTRIBUTE 
3 AT LEAST THAT AMOUNT TO HER. AND I MIGHT INDICATE I'M NOT — 
4 I'M NOT MAKING A — THESE FINDINGS ARE NOT REALLY BASED ON THE 
5 FACT THAT SHE'S DISSIPATED A LOT OF THOSE ASSETS. I — I FIND 
6 THAT UNFORTUNATE AND — BUT THAT HASN'T BEEN THE BASIS OF THE 
7 RULING HERE TODAY. JUST TROUBLESOME AS THAT MAY VERY WELL BE, 
8 AND CERTAINLY IT'S IRRESPONSIBILITY, THE WAY I CONSIDERED 
9 THAT, SO I UNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT THERE'S BEEN A DISSIPATION 
10 OF THOSE ASSETS THAT HAVE SET THIS STANDARD OF LIVING THAT I 
11 FIND TO BE REALLY UNREALISTIC FOR EVERYBODY, AND SO I DON'T 
12 GIVE IT AS MUCH WEIGHT AS TO WHAT THE NEEDS AND ABILITIES OF 
13 THE PARTIES MIGHT BE BECAUSE THEY DISSIPATED AND LIVED ON 
14 CREDIT. SO THAT'S MY RULING. COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
15 MR. HEALY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
16 THE COURT: ARE THERE ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS YOU'D LIKE 
17 TO MAKE COPIES OF AND THEN WITHDRAW THE ORIGINALS? 
18 MR. HEALY: I WOULD THINK MAYBE TAKE THE I.T.T. 
19 PAYMENT BOOK, SINCE IT'S A COUPON TYPE OF THING — 
20 THE COURT* I WONDERED ABOUT THAT. IF YOU'D LIKE TO 
21 [I HAVE THAT, WE'LL HAVE THE BAILIFF GO OUT AND MAKE A COPY OF 
22 H IT, THEN WE'LL SUBSTITUTE IT. 
23 II MR. HEALY: APPRECIATE THAT. 
24 II THE COURT: MR. HEALY, DO YOU WANT TO TELL HIM HOW 
25 || YOU WANT THAT COPIED OR — IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU — 
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1 II THAT MAY BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT FOR US. 
2 MR. HILLYARD: YOUR HONOR, ONE THING I DID THINK OF, 
3 YOU'RE NOT JUST SIMPLY GIVING HIM THE PROPERTY IN ARIZONA OR 
4 II NEW MEXICO, THERE'S NO FINDING ON — 
THE COURT: \jL'M J U S T ENDING THERE'S NO EQUITY IN 
IT. I'M GIVING IT TO HIM. 
MR. HILLYARD: OKAY. 
MR. HEALY: I JUST WONDER, ONE OTHER QUICK THING I 
HAVE BEFORE THE JUDGE LEAVES, JUST TALKING WITH MR. BELL AND 
HE INDICATED THAT THE PERIOD FROM 15 JUNE TO 15 JULY WOULD BE 
A GOOD TIME. CAN WE SET THAT WHILE WE'RE HERE TODAY? 
MR. HILLYARD: SHE NEEDS TO LOOK AT HER SCHEDULE. SEE 
WHAT SUMMER'S GOING TO BE LIKE. 
MR. HEALY: MAYBE YOU COULD TALK TO EACH OTHER ON THE 
PHONE AND INCLUDE THAT. 
MR. HILLYARD: SHE WILL KNOW SHORTLY, BUT SHE DIDN'T 
WANT TO MAKE A DECISION NOW. 
MR. HEALY: OKAY. FINE. 
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